



Cracking and Analyzing Apple iCloud backups, Find My iPhone, Document Storage

REcon 2013

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The need for iOS forensics

- More than 5 years on the market
- 6 iPhones, 5 iPods, 5 iPads
- 600+ million iOS devices sold worldwide
- “Smart devices” – carry a lot of sensitive data
- Corporate deployments are increasing

iOS data protection

- Device passcode

Protects unauthorized access to the device

Bypassing is not enough (used in encryption)

- Disk encryption

http://images.apple.com/iphone/business/docs/iOS_Security_Oct12.pdf

- Keychain

System-wide storage for sensitive data (keys, passwords etc.)

- Data is encrypted

iOS forensics

- Logical acquisition (iTunes backups)
- Physical acquisition
- iCloud backups and storage




iOS forensics: Logical Acquisition

- “Ask” the device to produce backup
- Device must be unlocked (by passcode or iTunes)
- Device may produce encrypted backup
- Limited amount of information

iOS forensics: Physical Acquisition

- Boot-time exploit to run unsigned code
 - or
 - Jailbreak
-
- Device lock state isn't relevant, can bruteforce passcode
 - Can get all information from the device
-
- ... but not for iPhone 4S, 5 or iPad 4 :(

iOS 4+ passcode




iCloud

- Introduced in Oct 2011
- Introduced with iOS 5
- 5 GB free storage
- Up to 50 GB paid storage
- Over 300 million users in June 2013
- Backups, documents, notes, calendar, Find My Phone



iCloud services



iCloud Control Panel



iCloud backups: why?



iCloud backup - what

- Contacts and Contact Favorites
- Messages (including iMessages)
- Call history
- Application data
- Device settings
- Camera roll (photos and videos)
- Purchases (music, movies, TV, apps, books)
- Mail accounts
- Network settings (saved Wi-Fi hotspots, VPN settings etc)
- Paired Bluetooth devices
- Offline web application cache/database
- Safari bookmarks, cookies, history, offline data
- ... and much more

iCloud backup - when

- Backup runs daily when the device is:
 - Connected to the Internet over Wi-Fi
 - Connected to a power source
 - Locked
- Can force backup
 - [Settings] | [iCloud] | [Storage & Backup] | [Back Up Now]

iCloud backup - how

Backups

Automatically Back Up

- iCloud**
Back up the most important data on your iPhone to iCloud.
- This computer**
A full backup of your iPhone will be stored on this computer.

Encrypt iPhone backup
This will also back up account passwords used on this iPhone.

[Change Password...](#)

Manually Back Up and Restore

Manually back up your iPhone to this computer or restore a backup stored on this computer.

[Back Up Now](#) [Restore Backup...](#)

Last backed up to iCloud: Today 1:52 AM



MTS RUS 18:11 94 %

iCloud Storage & Backup

Storage

Total Storage	55,0 GB
Available	48,7 GB
Manage Storage	>

[Change Storage Plan](#)

Backup

iCloud Backup **ON**

Automatically back up your camera roll, accounts, documents and settings when this iPhone is plugged in, locked and connected to Wi-Fi.

[Back Up Now](#)

iCloud CP: backups




Reverse-engineering iCloud backups

- jailbreak iPhone
- Install Open SSH, get keychain (keychain-2.db)
- [Settings] | [iCloud] | [Delete Account] | [Delete from My iPhone]
- [Settings] | [General] | [Reset] | [Reset All Settings]
- reboot
- set up Wi-Fi connection (proxy)
- replace keychain with our own trusted root certificate (need key 0x835 & keychain)
- ... read all the traffic :)
- Key 0x835 : Computed at boot time by the kernel. Only used for keychain protection
key835 = AES(UID, bytes("01"))

iCloud backup protocol flow

- Dynamic: endpoints depend on Apple ID
- Built on Google Protocol Buffers (mostly)
- Files are split into chunks
- Apple provides file-to-chunks mapping, chunk encryption keys, and full request info to 3rd-party storage provider (Amazon/Microsoft)
- Encryption key depends on chunk data

Files in iCloud



iCloud backup: authentication

query:

[https://setup.icloud.com/setup/authenticate/\\$APPLE_ID\\$](https://setup.icloud.com/setup/authenticate/$APPLE_ID$),

Authorization:Basic <authentication data>

authentication data = mime64 (AppleID:password)

returns: mmeAuthToken, dsPrsID

example:

GET /setup/authenticate/\$APPLE_ID\$ HTTP/1.1

Host: setup.icloud.com

Accept: */*

User-Agent: iCloud.exe (unknown version) CFNetwork/520.2.6

X-Mme-Client-Info: <PC> <Windows; 6.1.7601/SP1.0; W> <com.apple.AOSKit/88>

Accept-Language: en-US

Authorization: Basic cXR0LnRld3RAaWNtb3VklmNvbTqRd2VydHkxMjM0NQ==

iCloud backup: get auth. token, backup IDs, keys

query:

https://setup.icloud.com/setup/get_account_settings

Authorization:Basic <authentication data>

authentication data = mime64 (dsPrsID:mmeAuthToken)

returns: mmeAuthToken (new/other one!!)

query:

[https://p11-mobilebackup.icloud.com/mbs/\(dsPrsID\)](https://p11-mobilebackup.icloud.com/mbs/(dsPrsID))

Authorization: <authentication data>

authentication data = mime64 (dsPrsID:mmeAuthToken)

returns: list of backup IDs (backupudid)

query:

[https://p11-mobilebackup.icloud.com/mbs/2005111682/\(backupudid\)/getKeys](https://p11-mobilebackup.icloud.com/mbs/2005111682/(backupudid)/getKeys)

iCloud backup: download files (1)

Enumerate snapshots

HTTPS GET

[https://p11-mobilebackup.icloud.com/mbs/\(dsPrsID\)/\(backupudid\)/\(snapshotid\)/listFiles?offset=\(offset\)&limit=\(limit\)](https://p11-mobilebackup.icloud.com/mbs/(dsPrsID)/(backupudid)/(snapshotid)/listFiles?offset=(offset)&limit=(limit))

Get file authentication tokens

HTTPS POST

[https://p11-mobilebackup.icloud.com/mbs/\(dsPrsID\)/\(backupudid\)/\(snapshotid\)/getFiles](https://p11-mobilebackup.icloud.com/mbs/(dsPrsID)/(backupudid)/(snapshotid)/getFiles)

Get URLs for file chunks

HTTPS POST

[https://p11-content.icloud.com/\(dsPrsID\)/authorizeGet](https://p11-content.icloud.com/(dsPrsID)/authorizeGet)

iCloud backup: download files (2)

Download chunks

Windows Azure:

<http://msbnx000004.blob.core.windows.net:80/cnt/g6YMJKQBPxQruxQAr30C?sp=r&sr=b&byte-range=154-31457433&se=2013-06-07T10:14Z&st=2013-06-07T09:19Z&sig=0EdHy75gGHCee%2BjKePZBqz8xbWxpTxaYyASwFXVx2%2Fg%3D>

'se' contains iCloud authorization time (expires in one hour)

Amazon AWS:

<http://us-std-00001.s3-external-1.amazonaws.com/l9rh20QBPX4jizMAr3vY?x-client-request-id=739A222D-0FF5-44DD-A8FF-2A0EB6F49816&Expires=1371208272&byte-range=25556011-25556262&AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWWR33ECHKPC2LUA&Signature=PxAdegw0PLyBn7GWZCnu0bhi3Xo%3D>

iCloud encryption

- Data stored at 3rd-party storage providers is encrypted
- Apple has encryption keys to that data
- Some files are further encrypted using keys from OTA (over-the-air) backup keybag
- Keychain items are encrypted using keys from OTA backup keybag
- Need key 0x835 (securityd) to decrypt most keys from OTA backup keybag

iCloud backups - summary

- There is no user-configurable encryption for iCloud backups
- iCloud backups are stored in Microsoft and Amazon clouds in encrypted form
- Apple holds encryption keys and thus have access to data in iCloud backups
- If Apple stores 0x835 keys then it can also have access to Keychain data (i.e. passwords)
- Apple may have legal obligations to do this (e.g. legal enforcement)

iCloud protocol changes (March 2013)

Added:

X-Apple-MBS-Protocol-Version: 1.7

Accept: application/vnd.com.apple.mbs+protobuf



X-Apple-Request-UUID: 4EFFF273-5611-479B-A945-04DA0A0F2C3A

Changed:

X-MMe-Client-Info: <iPhone4,1> <iPhone OS;5.1.1;9B206> <com.apple.AppleAccount/1.0 (com.apple.backupd/(null))>

User-Agent: MobileBackup/5.1.1 (9B206; iPhone4,1)

Find My Phone



FindMyPhone protocol

How: just sniffing HTTP traffic (www.icloud.com, Find My Phone)

Authorization:

validate:

<https://setup.icloud.com/setup/ws/1/validate>)

ClientBuildNumber=1M.63768 (constant)

ClientId (random GUID)

<- instance

login:

<https://setup.icloud.com/setup/ws/1/login>

AppleID

extended_login

id=sha1(apple_id+instance)

password

<- dsid

Get devices with location:

initClient:

<https://p11-fmipweb.icloud.com/fmipservice/client/web/initClient>

refreshClient:

<https://p11-fmipweb.icloud.com/fmipservice/client/web/refreshClient>

id

dsid

<- content (location)

- Requesting location via Find My Phone makes push request to the iOS device if Find My Phone and Location Services are enabled
- Constant location requests quickly drain iPhone battery, device heats up, can be noticed
- Location information stored for 3 hours



FindMyPhone - demo output

```
locations.txt — Edited
===== Device #1=====
deviceModel = SixthGen-white
modelDisplayName = iPhone
id = QVBT0mIwMiZiMDY5ODg5NDA2MTcwMDhjOWY4MWRkOWU2YWlzM2UwN2JiY2M~
deviceDisplayName = iPhone 5
name = Vladimir's iPhone 5
batteryLevel = 0.700216
locationEnabled = 1
longitude = 37.6243
latitude = 55.8114
positionType = Wifi
isOld = 0
Device found: 00:00:27.786000 ago

===== Device #3=====
deviceModel = MacBookAir3_2
modelDisplayName = MacBook Air
id = QVBT0ig3MzBFNi05LTdGRjktNTkzRC1CMzI3LUZCMkRfNjA2NjRCRA~~
deviceDisplayName = MacBook Air 13"
name = Vladimir Katalov's MacBook Air
batteryLevel = 0
locationEnabled = 1
longitude = 0
latitude = 0
positionType =
isOld = 0
Device not found

===== Device #6=====
deviceModel = ThirdGen-4G
modelDisplayName = iPad
id = QVBT0jAzYiU2YzhiMjYzZWZhZmE3NWU2MTk5YzQzYz0wNDJiYTljNiRkZig~
deviceDisplayName = iPad
name = Vladimir Katalov's iPad
batteryLevel = 0.74746
locationEnabled = 1
longitude = 37.6245
latitude = 55.8113
positionType = Wifi
isOld = 0
Device found: 00:00:36.485000 ago
```


iCloud documents



iCloud: documents in iWork format only

EPBB: all formats

iCloud CP: documents



Get files from iCloud

To get list of files

- Authentication request (with given AppleID & password). Client gets mmeAuthToken in return; which, in order, is used to create authentication token (together with dsid). dsid (Destination Signaling Identifier) is an unique ID assigned to the user when registering at iCloud.com.
- Request to get AccountSettings. Client gets an URL (ubiquityUrl) with an address to get UUID (unique user identifier), file list, info on file tokens and for authorization.
- Request to get file list (POST). Output (for every file):
 - file name
 - file id
 - parent folder id
 - last change time
 - checksum
 - access rights

To download a given file

- Request to get a file token (using file id, checksum and aliasMap).
- Authorization request. Returns information on file chunks and containers. Output: container list (with URLs) and chunk information.

iCloud backup: packages

- KeyNote: PDF, Microsoft PowerPoint, KeyNote '09
- Pages: PDF, Microsoft Word, Pages '09
- Numbers: PDF, Microsoft Excel, Numbers '09
- Some other programs (1Password etc)

Many documents are stored as packages

Storage: plist + content (text, media files)

Requests:

- Validate
<https://setup.icloud.com/setup/ws/1/validate>
- Login
<https://setup.icloud.com/setup/ws/1/login>
- Export
[https://p15-ubiquityws.icloud.com/iw/export/\(dsid\)/export_document?...](https://p15-ubiquityws.icloud.com/iw/export/(dsid)/export_document?...)
- Check export status
[https://p15-ubiquityws.icloud.com/iw/export/\(dsid\)/check_export_status?...](https://p15-ubiquityws.icloud.com/iw/export/(dsid)/check_export_status?...)
- Download converted file
[https://p15-ubiquityws.icloud.com/iw/export/\(dsid\)/download_exported_document?](https://p15-ubiquityws.icloud.com/iw/export/(dsid)/download_exported_document?)

iCloud docs: demo output

```
files_list.txt — Edited ▾  
File name: buildVersionHistory.plist  
File path: /com~apple~Pages/Documents/EIFT FAQ.pages-tef/buildVersionHistory.plist  
File id: 4222124650662430  
File size: 221 bytes  
  
File name: index.db  
File path: /com~apple~Pages/Documents/EIFT FAQ.pages-tef/index.db  
File id: 4222124650662429  
File size: 376832 bytes  
  
File name: index.viewstate  
File path: /com~apple~Pages/Documents/EIFT FAQ.pages-tef/index.viewstate  
File id: 4222124650662435  
File size: 713 bytes  
  
File name: metadata.plist  
File path: /com~apple~Pages/Documents/EIFT FAQ.pages-tef/metadata.plist  
File id: 4222124650662431  
File size: 416 bytes  
  
File name: preview-micro.jpg  
File path: /com~apple~Pages/Documents/EIFT FAQ.pages-tef/preview-micro.jpg  
File id: 4222124650662442  
File size: 1489 bytes  
  
File name: preview-web.jpg  
File path: /com~apple~Pages/Documents/EIFT FAQ.pages-tef/preview-web.jpg  
File id: 4222124650662443  
File size: 11782 bytes  
  
File name: preview.jpg  
File path: /com~apple~Pages/Documents/EIFT FAQ.pages-tef/Previews/preview.jpg  
File id: 4222124650662444  
File size: 45229 bytes  
  
File name: EIFT FAQ.jpg  
File path: /com~apple~Pages/iWorkPreviews/EIFT FAQ.jpg  
File id: 4222124650662514  
File size: 45229 bytes
```

Possible usage

- Backups in iCloud
 - near-realtime acquisition (SMS, iMessage, mail, call logs)
 - browse backup data without actual device
 - download only data of specific type


- Find My Phone

- keep track
- using Google Maps (or whatever)
- track enter/leave pre-defined area
- 2+ devices simultaneously (meeting alert)

- Documents in iCloud

- open from 3rd party apps
- track changes
- download unsupported document data





- **Forensics!**



The Tools

Elcomsoft Phone Password Breaker www.elcomsoft.com

- Retrieves all iCloud backups (last 3 backups are stored)
- Wireless or fixed connection
- Downloads individual files or converts to iTunes format
- Access to iCloud backups from the PC
- Incremental backups (faster downloading)
- On-the-fly decryption
- No 2FA warning



Oxygen Forensic Suite 2011 Analyst

Main View Tools Service Help

All devices >> iTunes Backup (5dbe705b08a5c99f52622a013bdc933448d1d3a0) - 14.02.2011 15:01:31 [011742009311097] >> Phone Activity Filtering criteria ...

Search Export Print Reset Filters Help

Activity record info

Type	List	Date	Remote party	Contact	Description
SMS	Call	14.01.2011 8:00:14	+7963604103...		
SMS	Call	14.01.2011 8:00:38	+7963604103...		
SMS	Call	14.01.2011 8:01:03	+7963604103...		
SMS	Call	14.01.2011 8:02:11	+7963604103...		
SMS	SMS	14.01.2011 8:09:20	+7963604103...		What's up dude. Clarified it now?
SMS	SMS	14.01.2011 8:10:11	+7963604103...		Ugh, this is so crappy
SMS	SMS	14.01.2011 8:10:45	+7963604103...		He just mad cuz you took the spot
SMS	SMS	14.01.2011 8:14:10	+7963604103...		Want to help me figure out?
SMS	SMS	14.01.2011 8:14:48	+7963604103...		I prefer not to mess with these people
SMS	SMS	14.01.2011 8:15:31	+7963604103...		I feel like someone is watching me
SMS	SMS	14.01.2011 8:19:36	+7963604103...		I think it wont make any sense to him
SMS	SMS	14.01.2011 8:20:38	+7963604103...		
SMS	SMS	14.01.2011 8:23:20	+7963604103...		
SMS	SMS	14.01.2011 8:25:11	+7963604103...		
SMS	SMS	14.01.2011 8:25:31	+7963604103...		
SMS	SMS	14.01.2011 8:27:27	+7963604103...		
SMS	SMS	14.01.2011 8:28:28	+7963604103...		
System application	System application	17.01.2011 8:58:42			
System application	System application	17.01.2011 9:02:49			
IP connections	IP connections	18.01.2011 14:59:31			
IP connections	IP connections	18.01.2011 14:59:31			
IP connections	IP connections	18.01.2011 14:59:31			
IP connections	IP connections	18.01.2011 14:59:31			
IP connections	IP connections	18.01.2011 23:51:57			
IP connections	IP connections	18.01.2011 23:51:57			
IP connections	IP connections	18.01.2011 23:51:57			
IP connections	IP connections	18.01.2011 23:51:57			
Appointment	Appointment	28.04.2011 18:00:00			

Filters:

Date Filter: Февраль 2011

Remote Party Filter: Beards Michael, Bobson Nick

Analyst version: 3.0.0.791 iTunes Backup (5dbe705b08a5c99f52622a013bdc933448d1d3a0) Total: 560

Oxygen Forensic Suite

www.oxygen-forensic.com

- Comprehensive forensic analysis
- Built-in and third-party applications
- Deleted data analysis (from application databases)
- Calls, messages, contacts, event log, tasks, GPS locations
- Timeline: all user and system activities in a single view
- Communication circles
- Multiple devices analysis investigates interactions among users of multiple mobile devices

Simon Payge's iPhone 4S (Simon Payge) - Communication Statistics Diagram

Information and settings

Owner information: Simon Payge's iPhone 4S (Simon Payge)

Contact information: Lars Jason

Diagram settings

Remote party | Type | Time stamp | Text

lars.jason	Skype chat	2/5/2013 2:25:36 PM	Already
lars.jason	Skype chat	2/5/2013 2:25:31 PM	I am at the meeting sleady
lars.jason	Skype chat	2/5/2013 2:25:24 PM	Sorry will call you later
lars.jason	Skype chat	2/5/2013 2:25:01 PM	Back
lars.jason	Skype chat	2/5/2013 2:24:59 PM	Will check them as soon as I am
lars.jason	Skype chat	2/5/2013 2:24:50 PM	Yes but I have limited access to my mail box at the moment
lars.jason	Skype chat	2/5/2013 2:22:34 PM	Oh yes too much work, I am still in Berlin
lars.jason	Skype chat	9/6/2012 3:58:51 PM	Did you receive the money?
lars.jason	Skype chat	9/4/2012 2:31:47 PM	Fantastic

Lars Jason - Simon Payge's iPhone 4S (Simon Payge) Total: 16 Filtered: 16

Apple 2FA



Requires to verify your identity using one of your devices before you can:

- Sign in to [My Apple ID](#) to manage your account.
- Make an iTunes, App Store, or iBookstore purchase from a new device.
- Get Apple ID-related support from Apple.

Does NOT protect:

- iCloud backups (could it ever?)
- Find My Phone data (the only authorized device stolen?)
- Documents stored in the cloud
- iCloud backups restored onto a new iOS device = email from Apple
- iCloud backups retrieved with EPPB = no email

Apple 2FA (Two-step Verification)



Apple iOS 7 what's new


Disabling location services in iOS7 now requires Apple ID password
(better chances of finding stolen devices)

Keychain can be synced between Mac OS X and iOS

Keychain can be stored in iCloud, requires separate password

Icons Downright Ugly

Apple iOS 7



iCloud keychain

Click to lock the iCloud keychain.

appleid.apple.com (apple@elcomsoft.com)
Kind: Web form password
Account: apple@elcomsoft.com
Where: https://appleid.apple.com
Modified: 11 Jun 2013 07:31:55

Name	Kind	Date Modified	Keychain
accounts.google.com (Passwords not saved)	Web form password	11 Jun 2013 07:31:55	iCloud
AirPort	application password		
aknet	AirPort network password		
appleid.apple.com (apple@elcomsoft.com)	Web form password		
appleid.apple.com (qtt.test@gmail.com)	Web form password		
appleid.apple.com (qtt.test@icloud.com)	Web form password		
appleid.apple.com (vkatalov@mail.ru)	Web form password		
calendar.google.com	Internet password		
calendar.google.com	Internet password		
daw.apple.com (elcomsoft)	Web form password		
daw.apple.com (info@elcomsoft.com)	Web form password		
daw.apple.com (vkatalov@gmail.com)	Web form password		



69 items

iPod 10:42 AM

AutoFill Passwords Clear All

- appleid.apple.com
apple@elcomsoft.com
- appleid.apple.com
qtt.test@gmail.com
- appleid.apple.com
qtt.test@icloud.com
- appleid.apple.com
vkatalov@mail.ru
- daw.apple.com
elcomsoft
- daw.apple.com
info@elcomsoft.com
- daw.apple.com
vkatalov@gmail.com
- daw.apple.com
vkatalov@mail.ru

iCloud keychain - cont-d



Conclusion

- Balance between security, privacy and convenience
- iCloud security risks
- Use additional encryption
- Better 2FA implementation
- Need further work (photo streams, 3rd party apps data: 1Password etc)

Windows Phone backups

What is saved:

- Internet Explorer Favorites
- List of installed apps
- Theme and accent configuration
- Call history
- App settings (where applicable - email and accounts, lock screen etc)
- Text messages (SMS conversations)
- Photos (good quality - uses data allowance)

Can get with LiveSDK:

- Basic user information
- Contacts
- Calendars
- Files, photos, videos, documents

Download full backup?

Thank you!

Cracking and Analyzing Apple iCloud backups, Find My iPhone, Document Storage

REcon 2013

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